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Abstract
Focusing on the Berti of Sudan, this article assesses the role of Islam and Arabism as important variables in the social
construction of cultural identity of the studied people. In line with most relevant recent literature, the author looks at cultural
identity as a social construct, a dynamic ideology of shifting borders and a historical process that is grounded on diachronic
social formation. The article argues that the present Berti identity is a conscious reflection of their subordinate position
vis-à-vis the kingdoms and states which have dominated Sudan over the past few centuries.
Who are the Berti?
The Berti live in the northern Darfur Province of the Repub-
lic of Sudan. Their land extends roughly from line 13◦44′ to
14◦34′ N and from line 25◦16′ to 56◦17′ E. Other smaller
Berti communities have established themselves in various
other parts of the country.
The Berti live in small permanent villages and practise a
combination of hoe cultivation and animal husbandry. Millet
is the main crop although other crops like sorghum, sesame,
peanuts, okra and hibiscus are also cultivated. Animals kept
by the people include goats, sheep, cows and camels (for
more details on economy see Holy, 1973; El-Tom, 1997).
Until several generations ago, the Berti spoke their own
language which belonged to the middle Sahara language
group. Since then, they have evolved their own brand of
Arabic as a mother tongue.
The Berti are Muslims and like all Muslims in northern
Sudan, they follow the Maliki school of Islamic law. Pub-
lic sacrifices and rituals are common features of Berti life.
These are religious sacrifices for health, rain, rites of pas-
sage, misfortunes and public festivities. Technical religious
knowledge required for rituals accompanying these sacri-
fices comes from local religious leaders known as fugara
(sing. fekki; see El-Tom, 1982, 1988; Holy, 1991).
1This paper is based on a number of fieldwork visits carried out during the
1980s and 1990s. Visits were confined to Berti rural area and may not do
justice to urban centres. The author is grateful for comments made by staff
of Kimmage Mission Institute, Dublin, for whom this paper was originally
written. The author also benefited from comments made by K. Beck and
R. Seeseman of the University of Bayreuth, in addition to those of the three
anonymous reviewers of GeoJournal.
The Berti and Islam
The year 1317 A.D. was a turning point in the history of
Christianity and Islam in the Sudan. The king of the hitherto
Christian Nubian Kingdom converted to Islam. The conver-
sion was officially launched by changing the royal church
into a mosque (Hassan, 1973, p. 125). This incident was
not the start of the infiltration of the Arab Muslims into the
Sudan but a result of it. The influx of the Arab nomads and
traders was sanctioned by the historical Non-aggression Pact
between the already Muslim Egypt and the Christian Nubian
Kingdom (Hassan, 1973, pp. 114–115). It was, however, not
until the fourteenth century that the penetration of the Arabs
into the sultanate of Darfur, in the Berti area, was reported
(O’Fahey, 1980, p. 5). This report took the form of official
complaint to the Muslim King of Egypt (Hassan, 1973; see
also Hassan, 1977).
Recent sultanates of Darfur (1650–1916), of which the
Berti were a part, also attracted many migrants from Mus-
lim west Africa. Their position on the pilgrimage route to
Mecca was significant: many migrants did not proceed be-
yond them, while others settled there on their way back from
Mecca. Unlike the bottom-up adoption of Islam in Nubia,
the new religion here was adopted first by the kings of Darfur
and then spread downwards. Reminiscent of modern Sudan,
religion was used by the ruling dynasty as a basis for le-
gitimacy. This process of early Islamisation of the dynasty
is best expressed by the legend of the ‘wise stranger’ who
came and married into the ruling family:
“. . . the supersession of the Tunjur by the Keira [royal
lineages] is ascribed to Ahmed al-Maqur, Ahmed ‘the
ham stringed’: An Arab from North Africa. ... Ahmed
was hamstringed by his brother after a quarrel over the
latter’s wife, but was rescued from the desert and taken
to the Tunjur King, Show Dorshid. Show is portrayed as
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a mysterious and tyrannical ruler, feared by his subjects;
Ahmed won his favour and his daughter by introducing
new and more civilised ways – for example of eating”
(O’Fahey, 1980, p. 123).
The myth of the wise stranger is not unique to the Fur people.
Fairly similar versions are reported from among the Su-
danese of the Nuba Mountains (Trimingham, 1968, p. 135)
and they exist among the Berti as well. Indeed many Mus-
lims as well as Christians across the world exhibit myths
of similar structure (cf. St. Patrick of Ireland). The wise
stranger of the Berti is Mohammed Yanbar (also Janbar,
meaning big turbaned), the ancestor of the ruling Basanga
lineage. This lineage continued to supply Berti kings until
the present time. According to the story, Janbar is said to
have been dispatched from Mecca specially to convert the
Berti pagans single-handedly. The Berti were then ruled by
their ancestor, the giant, Namudu. Close to the border of
the Berti territory, Yanbar secluded himself for seven years
meditating in the desert. Having successfully strengthened
himself by seclusion, he resumed his journey to meet his
host, the giant Namudu. Yanbar was armed by the most
potent of all arsenals, the power of God, derived from the
Koran and the tyrant Namudu became both passive and co-
operative. It did not take Janbar long to impress his host by
his skill and wisdom. His superior wisdom was soon demon-
strated by many values and practices which he advised; most
notably by changing the method of eating which put an end
to the scourge of hunger which had bedeviled Namudu and
his subjects. In their communal meal times, the Berti used
to wait for the dishes of food to be brought from different
houses in the village. Each time a dish was presented, the
people rushed and consumed the food and waited for the
next dish to arrive. As a result eating times were interrupted
by periods of waiting. More importantly, the food was never
blessed as grace was never said. Despite the vast amount
of food consumed, the community always remained hungry.
Yanbar did not like the habit and eventually intervened. His
first task was to make everybody wait until all the food was
brought. He then taught the people to say grace before par-
taking in the food: ‘In the name of Allah, the Merciful, the
Compassionate’. The urge to attack the food also became
redundant; the manna looked abundant for everybody. This
advice made a significant difference. It was that between a
full belly and continuous hunger. Everybody was satisfied
for the first time and plenty of food was left at the end.
Namudu was most impressed by his guest. His immediate
reward was to appoint Yanbar as a chief over all his subjects.
There was, however, a hurdle to cross; Yanbar had to join the
royal lineage if he was to qualify. For this, Namudu offered
him his daughter to take in a pagan marriage. Yanbar was
agreeable but only if the marriage took place following the
sunna, i.e. the prophetic way of taking spouses. In essence,
this is the introduction of Islamic marriage, in opposition to
the hitherto, abduction of sexual partners. To copper fasten
the new rules and values introduced, Yanbar had to establish
a Koranic school and teach the locals the Koran and the Is-
lamic way of living. The conversion process was well under
way but was not yet complete. Justice could only be restored
by getting rid of the tyrant, Namudu. For this, Yanbar re-
sorted again to his religious power which had served him
well before. It was not very long before the giant conceded
defeat and was forced to evacuate the area. He headed west,
perhaps to the very same mysterious destination from which
he had originally come.
This Berti narrative shows remarkable parallels with its
Fur counterpart. Despite the difference in names, contexts
and motivations, the structure of the text is the same. In
both, there is a wise and just intruder crusading against a
chaotic and despotic tyrant. The wise stranger originates in
Mecca, with all its symbolic attributes: holiness, lack of
ambiguity and association with the east which is the most
auspicious direction for the Berti (Holy, 1983). After all, it
is to the east that one turns for prayers, converts animals
into hallal meat and is oriented in the grave at death for
eternal rest. Namudu’s place of origin is, on the other hand,
ambiguously located in the west. The saviour belongs to the
‘appropriate’ religion while the host is an unbeliever with
all the connotations of the term. The intruder has a definite
genealogy while that of his host is obscure and mysterious.
The wise man draws his authority and hence power from
God while the tyrant depends on mundane physical repres-
sion for domination. Lastly, through blessing and organising
food consumption, the intruder was able to eliminate hunger
which dominated the reign of his predecessor.
The intruder is assimilated into the society of his host in
two basic ways: firstly, the values of the wise man regarding
group action, eating, marriage, learning the Koran, saying
prayers, etc, prove superior and are therefore adopted by his
hosts.
Secondly, the pedigree of the wise man is adopted and his
marriage into the ruling lineage enables him to be claimed as
an ancestor. Again the marriage of the wise man is important
in at least two respects: firstly, it provides the ruling lineage
with legitimacy and therefore with reverence afforded to a
dynastic royal family. Such is the case with the Keira of the
neighbouring Fur (O’Fahey, 1980, p. 123) and the Basanga
of the Berti. Secondly, it gives Islam a strong hold which
favours its adoption by the subjects. There is indeed ample
evidence of kings enforcing the spread of Islam. The fact that
Islam subsequently became the religion of the ruling elite
made the new ideology more appealing to the masses.
Islamisation of western Sudan went hand in hand with
the Arabisation of the people. The dual process – which is
still advancing – is far from being unique to the western
region of the Sudan and is common to many areas of the
northern Sudan (O’Fahy, 1980, p. 123; see, Hassan, 1966,
p. 122) where many ethnic groups have been incorporated
into the Arab kinship system, despite the limited size of
Arab immigration into the country. Among the Berti, the
claim to Arab ancestry is, more or less, open to its alleged 99
lineages.2 Many Berti claim to have copies of written pedi-
2To insist that there are 99 lineages among the Berti is to go for a static way
of looking at divisions within an ethnic group. The number of these divi-
sions should be taken as in a continuous process of fission and fusion. The
importance of the figure 99 perhaps lies more in its symbolic importance
as an auspicious figure. For example, God is known to have 99 names in
Islam. The list of these names can be heard recited by children in Koranic
157
Figure 1. A Basanga pedigree. The document reads: ‘This is the pedigree of Osman Abdalla El-Tom, his brother Mohammed Saleh Abdalla El-Tom, and
their sisters Ashaya Abdalla El-Tom, Medinna. . . , Hajja. . . and Halima. . . ’ Some of the names are followed by comments or nicknames. The Pedigree
ends as follows: ‘Son of Shareef Hasan son of Imam Ali who was the father of Hasan and Hesain and who were the sons of our prophetess Fatima
El-Zahraa; the daughter of the prophet Mohammed. . . , with whom the pedigree ends’. (Symbols:  woman, N man, = marriage alliance.)
grees but I managed to obtain only two different pedigrees
belonging to the Basanga and the Sharafa (also known as
kashirto) lineages. Some members of the Sharafa lineage are
particularly obsessed with their written pedigrees and prob-
ably have more copies in circulation than any other lineage
in the area. Their name indicates a claim to direct genealogi-
cal connection with prophet Mohammed whose ethnic group
was referred to as Sharafa as well.3 The Basanga similarly
claim to be Sharafa though they rarely stress it as their
‘cousins’, the members of the Sharafa lineage, do. This per-
haps relates to the position of the two lineages in the Berti
political structure. The two lineages are narrated to have
schools as well as formal schools. The prophet, too, has 99 names which
are also learnt, though to a lesser degree. Moreover, the rosary chain used
for prayers also consists of 99 units of beads.
3Others say that this lineage is known as Kashirto and has only recently
assumed its new name Sharafa. Its claim to Arab ancestry is an exaggerated
pursuit of what is open for all other lineages of the Berti. This is indeed
a sensitive issue which culminated into a court case in the area only a few
decades ago.
had an old accord which was designed to reduce tension
between them which was precipitated by their rivalry over
the political leadership of the Berti. The agreement gave the
Basanga full authority over political affairs in return for their
withdrawal from religious leadership. On the other hand, the
Sharafa were accorded full power in the religious domain
on condition that they would not interfere in the political
leadership of the Berti. The accord was soon to be used
by the two lineages for their political and religious domains
respectively. To this day, the Basanga emphasize their Berti-
ness to enhance their political legitimacy while the Sharafa
stress their prophetic origin which consolidates their reli-
gious position. The written pedigrees support the version of
the oral history that the two lineages share a common ances-
tor (see Figures 1 and 2). Yanbar of the Basanga is said to
have been accompanied, or elsewhere, followed, by a cousin
called Shareef Dawazain (also Dawazaid), the ancestor of
the Sharafa. Dawazain is located only 8 generations above
the present one in the Sharafa pedigree. A gap of a few
generations occurs when we compare this with Yanbar who
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Figure 2. A Sharafa pedigre. The document reads: ‘Khaleefa Omer said: learn your pedigree so that you maintain contact with your relatives’.
(Symbols:  woman, N man, = marriage alliance.)
is placed 11–13 generations back in the pedigree. The com-
mon ancestor in the two pedigrees is four generations above
Yanbar and only one generation above Dawazain. Above this
point, the two Pedigrees merge together into the same line
of names. They are, however, far from being identical and
a few names are either added, omitted or differently spelt.
The pedigrees connect the living people with the prophet
34–37 generations above. My reference to only two different
pedigrees should not imply that other similar documents do
not exist in the area. Moreover, many Berti claim Arab an-
cestry in the orally transmitted account of their history, a fact
which carries equal analytic weight. This of course indicates
a strong correlation between Islamisation and Arabisation.
Indeed the Berti often speak about the two processes as if
they were synonymous. This can best be attested to with
reference to their conceptualisation of circumcision. Some
scholars claim that the practice was introduced in the Sudan
by Muslim Arabs and/or accorded an Islamic attribute after-
wards (Lewis, 1966, pp. 52, 68; El-Tom, 1996). Alternative
terms used for circumcision could be translated as: ‘to Ara-
bise’ (yaarib) or ‘to usher the novices into the prophetic way
of life’ (yidakhilhum fi el sunna).
The connection between Islam and Arabisation is indica-
tive of two distinctive ideals: to be an Arab and a Muslim.
This is clearly shown in geomancy in which the Berti por-
tray their neighbours of the four cardinal directions. Two
indices are used to describe these neighbours: Firstly, their
ritual cleanliness, symbolic of their piety as prayers neces-
sitate continuous ritual ablution (wadhu & ghusl). This is
in opposition to ritual impurity in the absence of prayers
and by implication lack of ablution. Hence, a group can be
described as (ritually) clean or dirty (tahir or nigis).
Secondly, a group is assessed according to its intelligi-
bility indicated by its fluency in the Arabic language. Thus,
those who speak Arabic are regarded as intelligible (mu-
fatiheen lit. intelligent, open-minded). Those who do not,
are simply tugoom and mugaffaleen (dull, stupid, blocked-
minded). It is not the geographical centrality of the Berti
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and their land which is important. Rather, it is their ethno-
centric election of themselves as arbitrators of others around
them. In their assessment of others, it is those to the east of
Berti and who are in effect the power holders in the Sudan
who score positive on both accounts. In some sense, this
may indicate acknowledgement of the power appropriated
by this group in modern Sudan. Equally, this may highlight
the Berti’s aspiration to identify with their culture which is
propagated by the state machinery as ‘the national Sudanese
culture’ per se (El-Tom, 1993).
Appropriation of Islam did not result in uniformly Mus-
lim societies. As noted by Geertz, various societies we refer
to as Muslim exhibit only a few characteristics in common
(Geertz, 1968). Deviation from Islamic orthodoxy defined
in local, national or universal terms appears to be stronger in
Muslim black Africa (see Holy, 1991). As Morsy put it, the
Islamic religion in African societies is a fusion of orthodox
beliefs and practices belonging to the indigenous pre-Islamic
religious systems (Morsy, 1978, p. 109). The appropriation
of Islam by any societies including the Berti, is necessar-
ily syncretic in the sense of selective localisation of certain
elements of the new religion (see Shaw and Stewart, 1994).
In Berti society, adherence to Islam is emphasized more
at the collective than at the individual level. Islamic rituals
are enthusiastically performed when they are collective in
nature: festive prayers and rituals accompanying marriages,
rain-making, funerals, naming ceremonies, to mention but
a few. At the individual level, Islamic rituals are grossly
neglected. This is clear in the case of the Muslim daily
prayers and ritual ablutions. Only a handful of individuals
in each village, mostly of the upper cohort, perform their
daily prayers. In sharp contrast to this, the two annual festive
prayers of pilgrimage to Mecca and the end of the fasting
month of Ramadan are attended by the whole adult sector of
village populations. This is despite the orthodox rule which
accords the individual daily prayers higher importance than
the festival prayers. The former are enforced by the Koran
and theologically classed as (farad), i.e. obligatory rituals.
The latter are mere imitation of the practice of the prophet
(sunna) and are not obligatory. The proclaimed adherence
to Islam sometimes involves reinterpretation of certain re-
ligious rules. The majority of the Berti villagers live on
home-made millet beer which forms the greater part of their
daily diet. Most of them are prepared to go into elaborate
details justifying the status of this beer with reference to
Islamic laws. Some argue that the alcohol forbidden in the
Koran belongs to the category of the locally distilled spirit
and does not include millet beer. Others see its lawfulness as
contingent on its local production and acquisition; in other
words, it is perfectly legal when it is procured by lawful
means. It is also argued that the process of its production
includes cultivation of millet which is in itself seen as a re-
ligious practice. Again some see the consumption of beer
as legal so long as it does not induce the drinker to cause
trouble to other people. As the beer contains a low level of
alcohol, it is often assumed that it rarely causes drunkenness
anyway. These views have now been challenged by the new
Islamic laws which are gradually gaining ground in the area,
particularly in urban centres.
The Berti have to some degree adopted the Islamic lunar
calendar. Nonetheless, their system of time reckoning is still
cyclical since it is only the month and not the year which is
known. The fast of the month of Ramadan is enthusiastically
observed, especially by men. Non-observance of fasting is
believed to invite misfortune on the whole community. The
attribution of a collective status to an individual action can
also be noticed in the case of homicide. It is normally settled
by a collective payment of diya (blood money, see Holy,
1972). The diya represents a collective acceptance of the re-
sponsibility which should, according to orthodox Islam fall
on the individual killer (Lewis, 1974, p. 108). The payment
of religious dues (zakat) and alms (sadaga) are more or less
observed by the Berti. Failure to pay them is known to de-
crease wealth as well as to incur the inevitable punishment
after death. To withhold them is not only a crime but a sin.
The last part of the Islamic creed enjoins upon the believ-
ers the obligation of the pilgrimage to Mecca, if they have
sufficient means. The Berti have little enthusiasm for making
the pilgrimage compared to Muslim West Africans. Unlike
the Berti, the West Africans do not accept the long distance
to Mecca as an excuse. Even though a pilgrim acquires a title
and a status for himself/herself when he/she fulfils the duty,
this is much less of an incentive for the Berti than for the
Muslims in West Africa. The pilgrimage to Mecca is often
substituted by a visit to a local shrine or tomb, as is generally
the case in northern Sudan and some other Islamic areas.
There are no famous tombs in the Berti area and few Berti
make the effort to visit shrines in other parts of the country.
There is, however, an insignificant number of local shrines
which are visited by some people. Most of these shrines are
of unknown saints.
The sex division of religion whereby men are more Mus-
lim and women are more ‘pagan’ has been noted in Muslim
Black Africa (Trimingham, 1968, p. 46). Islam shows a
tendency towards masculinity whereby men enjoy a certain
degree of monopoly, particularly in regard of its public facets
(see Lewis, 1986; Holy, 1991). This holds true to a very
large extent also for the Berti. Village women do attend
the prayers performed for the two annual festivals. Their
attendance is, however, poor compared to that of the men.
They neither attend the rain and misfortune rituals, nor do
they participate in prayers performed at burials, deaths and
marriages. With regard to the individual daily prayer, they
are the least proficient in performing it. In theory, girls are
welcome in the Koranic schools. Their number is, however,
comparatively low and confined to those below the age of
ten (see El-Tom, 1982). It is perhaps possible to argue that
women offset their marginalisation in Berti Islam in other
ways. They remain the reservoir of the pagan cults which
prevail parallel to Islam. These are the rituals classified by
the Berti as customary rites (aada) or occasionally supersti-
tion (sanam). These rites are performed at various stages of
millet cultivation and life crisis and rites of passage. Lewis
in his work among the Somalis regards the attraction of
women to these cults (for example zar) as a form of response
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to their exclusion from other public rituals (Lewis, 1966,
p. 64). An interesting duality exists in the administration
of divination and the treatment of illness by the Berti. The
Islamic geomancy co-exists side by side with other methods
of divination, notably, the use of cowrie shells and trance
possession. The former is dominated by men and sourced in
Islamic texts while the latter is dominated by women and
with less claim to have a religious origin. Koranic med-
ication performed by learned religious healers is a mere
alternative to herbalism practised by illiterate rootmen.
The confinement of women to the backyard of the house,
a feature identified with Islam, is observed by the Berti to
a lesser extent than in many other Islamic societies. Still,
Islam has left its mark on Berti house architecture. There
is always a separate area for women in a house. Yet, their
separation does not exclude them from the majority of so-
cial activities. They cannot be regarded as socially dead in
the way Gilsenan describes the Lebanese women he studied
(Gilsenan, 1982). Women work jointly with men in fields,
markets, water delivery, etc.
Premarital pregnancy is frequent and does not create
the enduring stigma that is attached to it among the Arab
Bedouins. An illegitimate birth is certainly regretted but the
child’s illegitimacy is soon forgotten. In contrast with the
Islamic code of practice, a fine and an oath are sufficient to
settle cases of adultery. This is now coming under increasing
pressure from the new Islamic laws which were introduced
since 1983 but have not been fully implemented in the area.
Peripherality and the Arab–Islamic identity
The drive towards Arab–Islamic identity cannot be under-
stood without recourse to the subordinate position which
the Berti occupied throughout their documented history
of the region. Since the 13th century, the Berti have al-
ways been under hegemonic power of kingdoms, colonial
states and more recently under the post-independence gov-
ernments of riverain Sudan. Throughout, the Berti sought
empowerment through their increased incorporation into the
Arab–Islamic world. Various kingdoms of Darfur from 13th
century onwards, prospered from their connections with the
Arab–Islamic world. The Muslims brought a wealth of state
administrative skills aided by literacy and a unifying faith.
In short they were among the earliest agents of modernity.
Darfur kingdoms remained in touch through their caravan
trade routes to Egypt, and their annual contribution to the
refurbishment (kiswiyya, mahmal) of the holy mosque in
Mecca (Hassan, 1977, p. 212).
The Turko-Egyptian rule over Sudan (1821–1885) fur-
ther consolidated this process. Sudan became a part of the
Muslim empire and a source of immense wealth to the
coloniser. It is here that we learn that the merit of convert-
ing to Islam goes beyond redeeming one’s own soul. It was
narrated that the Turks ordered their slave traders to set free
all captives who turned out to be Muslims and confine future
raids to ‘pagan areas’.
The Mahdi’s rule of 1885–1898 again leaned on both
Islam and Arabism as a source of legitimacy. The Mahdi
was not merely a Messiah and later a saint, he was also a
direct descendant of Prophet Mohammed, a Shareef. The
Mahdist state adopted a rigorous implementation of Islamic
law across the state. This era also witnessed an intense power
struggle between inhabitants of northern and central Sudan
(riverain Sudanese) and the westerners (gharraba) whose ori-
gin is in the western provinces of the country. The struggle
was further fuelled by the very fact that the Mahdi’s deputy
and later successor (Khalifa) himself was a westerner and
had maintained power via the support of his fellow region
men. Surprisingly, the Khalifa remained a gharraba in the
eyes of the riverain Sudanese despite the fact that his ethnic
group was much closer to those in riverain Sudan in their
Arab cultural orientation.
The crushing defeat of the Mahdist state by the Anglo-
Egyptian/British forces (1898–1956) paved the way for the
domination of the riverain Sudanese over others in the coun-
try. It is the riverain Sudanese who were to assist the colonial
power and later to succeed them in running the country af-
ter independence (1956). The entire state machinery was
to become a hegemonic base for riverain Sudanese, most
notably in politics, administration and military domains.
The spoils of the inherited decision-making structures of the
state were further translated into economic capital, thanks to
the riverain Sudanese merchants (Jallaba) who monopolised
trade throughout the country and spearheaded the spread of
riverain lifestyle (see Beck, 1998; Manger, 1994). The new
era also witnessed an evolution of the riverain Sudanese cul-
ture as a microcosm for the whole nation. The entire state
machinery (law, economy, education, arts, media) was mo-
bilised to impress upon the nation the new identity. Diverse
groups of north and central Sudan were to be approximated
into a single monolithic stream informed by Arabism and Is-
lamism. Through a mixture of mythology and manipulation
of ‘facts’, the children of the new nation are inspired to look
to the holy land across the Red Sea for their history, heritage
and creed. This evolves into a fundamental strength of Is-
lam over the Christian faith. Through the western control of
its upper echelon, the latter remained a religion of the out-
siders, propagated by Europeans rather than near and distant
ancestors. In mid 1980s, a Sudanese Minister for Culture
and Information ordered the management of Sudan National
Museum to be true to their history.4 The Museum was to
be reordered to show just that. Several historical objects,
many of early Christian and Nubian Sudan, were removed
in favour of new Islamic artifacts.
The division of Sudan into two cultural entities is cer-
tainly a simplified picture of a much more complex reality.
The dominant ethnic group(s) represent in fact a collec-
tion of several diversified cultural and linguistic groups.
The claim to a truer Arab ancestry is perhaps what earned
them the term Awlad Al-Arab (children of the Arab). Their
domination over the country is further reflected by the
widely used term Awlad Al-Balad (children of the country).
Monopoly over Arabism and indeed power went hand in
4The Minister was Abdallla Mohammed Ahmed whose affiliation to Mus-
lim ‘fundamentalism’ earned him several important posts in the current
Sudanese government of Al-Bashir.
161
hand with the deprivation of the others. These include many
but most notably the Gharraba, the southerners, the Nuba,
the Beja and the Ingessana. In themselves, they are of diverse
cultural origins, unified only by their relative exclusion from
power. The fact that many of these dominated groups are
Muslims and are well versed in Arab culture hardly matters:
“While the Western regions of Darfur and Kordofan
compare similarly well to the south in terms of unequal
access to education and other services, this fact has over
the years being covered under the blanket of common
Muslim religion and Arabic culture. When signs of un-
rest and political protest were expressed during the mid
1970’s in demand mainly for more equality, this agita-
tion was suppressed as being mainly racist” (Ibrahim,
1989, p. 40; quoted in Harir, 1994).
The very construction of the national identity on the bases
of Religion and Arabism is problematic in its differential
availability to all in the same country. While the Berti can
flaunt their connection to Islam and Arabism, many oth-
ers cannot. The ‘pagan’ and Christian southerners are a
case in point. Their retention of African cultures and their
pride of African origin make it untenable and often undesir-
able to identify with the chosen national identity. Increased
emphasis on Islamism in recent years made it even more
difficult to forge alliances with Muslim groups who do not
fit into the riverain Sudan identity. It is these latter groups
who have borne the brunt of the recent policy code-named
‘the Comprehensive Call to Islam’ which underpinned Al-
Bashir’s government’s commitment to Sharia laws. This
Campaign aims at completing the Islamic project of the
government through (a) religious indoctrination, (b) general
favouritism for supporters of the Campaign, (c) mobilisation
for Jihad against government opponents and (d) isolation
of Christians, pagans and non-supporters (see Salih, 1995,
p. 75).
The Berti are perhaps more fortunate compared to those
who are more marginal within this project. The Compre-
hensive Call foisted upon them aims at and is restricted to
ensuring their conformity to the government brand of Islam.
More importantly, they are also mobilised through the same
Campaign to enforce Islam on others and hence the call for
‘Jihad’ against the infidels. Battalions of volunteers known
as Popular Defense Forces fight the now ‘Jihad’ war along-
side the government’s formal army. ‘Jihad’ as portrayed by
the government propaganda is a holy war whose Godly re-
ward is infinite. Muslims who die during ‘Jihad’ are declared
martyrs, often seen in holy dreams decorated by henna, rem-
iniscent of Sudanese weddings, and surrounded by beautiful
and ‘albeit virgin’-mermaids of heaven (see Sultan, 1997).5
Their enemies are not so fortunate. They simply perish
(yahlaku) in war and end up in hell. Many men from the
Berti area have participated in these ‘holy wars’. While some
might have been enticed by the translucent heavenly mer-
maids, many others have been whipped to war through the
government efficient carrot and stick mobilisation tactics.
5Henna is used during wedding celebration by both the bride and the groom.
Its use here indicates that the martyr is wedded to the heavenly mermaids.
The Comprehensive Call Campaign is also instrumen-
tal in many other fields in the area: Its members organise
preaching through their wandering learned men, form Ko-
ran study groups and rename schools and classrooms after
historic Islamic figures. Through multiplicity of committees
in all communities, agents of the Comprehensive Call also
act as informants in all matters concerning the application of
‘sharia laws’.
Conclusion
The myth of Namudu and his Arab visitors affords us great
insight into the way the Berti subscribe to history in their
rationalisation of their current identity. A point of caution
is due at this stage. In as much as it subscribes to the past,
myth as a form of narrative here should be seen as an account
of present Berti reality whose principal tenet is an aspira-
tion to be a part of the grand Arab Muslim world. Past and
present power dynamics in the area hardly dictate otherwise.
Throughout, the Berti alluded to ethnicity as a cornerstone
for forging their cultural identity. The process involves both
defining their own boundaries and legitimating alliance with
others; in particular the dominant sector of the state. Three
basic points are important here with regard to ethnicity and
identity construction: Firstly, the formation of Berti cultural
identity is a continuous process that is highly responsive to
outside influence. To look at ethnicity as a dynamic process
rather than an invention of the past is nothing new although
it has often been missed in relevant literature; a point which
has been raised by many others (Storey, 1997; Class, 1995;
Stephen, 1996). The case of the Berti indeed depicts ethnic-
ity as an ideology that is continuously shaped by interactions
within a wider state, both colonial and post-independence
(Storey, 1997; Class, 1995; Stephen, 1996).
Secondly, ethnicity here is a cultural construct and a
flexible ideology rather than a product of biological repro-
duction. Some may, however, feel more comfortable to
treat biological reproduction itself as no more than socially
manufactured perception.
Thirdly, the mere presentation of ethnicity as a construct
which is continuously in the making and unmaking pre-
supposes a rejection of ethnicity as, to borrow O’Brien’s
words, ‘an immutable primordial entity’ (O’Brien, 1986,
p. 898). The rejection of reification of ethnicity lends sup-
port to its treatment as a dynamic formation of shifting
borders. In that, the emphasis of ethnicity as a historical
process, grounded on diachronic social formation, should be
paramount (O’Brien, 1986, p. 898; Eriksen, 1991).
Islam occupies a prominent position in the Berti con-
struction of identity. It provides meaningful ways of know-
ing the world and of interacting both within the group and
with the others. It is a venue into modernity and a ticket
for entry into and acceptability in the dominant riverain cul-
ture (see Seesemann, 1998; Manger, 1994). The acquisition
of Arab–Islamic identity has been gradual but incessant.
Over several centuries, every single state, of which the Berti
were a part, contributed to their increased Islamisation. The
British colonial rule was no exception in this regard. It
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protected them against the incursion of missionaries, for-
malised the teaching of Arabic and codified Islamic rules
in family laws governing marriage, divorce, inheritance, etc.
Enforcement of a tighter version of Islam has, however, been
intensified in recent years, following the post-1983 govern-
ments. This has left its mark in different aspects of Berti life:
most notably the consumption of alcohol, dress codes for
women, observance of prayers and more recently involve-
ment in Jihad. While recent Islamic and cultural policies
may be seen as an attempt to homogenise the Muslim part
of the Sudan, their impact on the unity of the whole nation
is bleak. Among others, these policies have widened the di-
vide between the Muslim and non-Muslim segments of the
nation.
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